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Abstract

In recent years, several empirical studies have claimed to provide evidence in support of the popular folk notion that people possess “gaydar” that enables them to accurately identify who is gay or lesbian (Rule, Johnson, & Freeman, 2016). This conclusion is
limited to artificial lab settings, however, and when translated to real-world settings this work itself provides evidence that people’s
judgments about who is gay/lesbian are not pragmatically accurate. We also briefly review evidence related to the consequences of
perpetuating the idea of gaydar (i.e., “the gaydar myth”). Although past claims about accurate orientation perception are misleading, the work that gave rise to those claims can nevertheless inform the literature in meaningful ways. We offer some recommendations for how the evidence in past “gaydar” research can be reappraised to inform our understanding of social perception and
group similarities/differences.

One of the first idioms English-speaking children learn is
that “You can’t judge a book by its cover.” This metaphorical phrase is meant to convey the principle that appearance is not a good and reliable way to make judgments
about others. How people look, whether in regard to their
attractiveness, their clothing, or the color of their skin, is
but a very thin slice of a whole, complex human being,
making it unlikely that any one attribute or set of attributes can accurately convey the complexity of another
person. This idiom is likely so common because snap
judgments, which often arise from stereotypes and implicit
biases, are difficult to overcome (Cox, Abramson, Devine,
& Hollon, 2012; Devine, 1989; Devine, Forscher, Austin, &
Cox, 2012). A key reason for this difficulty is the existence
of legitimizing myths—personal or cultural narratives that,
one way or another, support reliance on processes such as
stereotyping, snap judgments, or intuitions (e.g., Chen &
Tyler, 2001; Glaser, 2005; Pettigrew, 1979; Quist & Resendez, 2002; Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992; Uhlmann &
Cohen, 2007). In a recent article (Cox, Devine, Bischmann,

& Hyde, 2016), we identified how one such cultural narrative, “the gaydar myth,” perpetuates stereotyping to infer sexual orientation.
The Gaydar Myth and Stereotyping to Infer
Orientation
Because sexual orientation is not a visible group status,
people often rely on stereotypic attributes commonly associated with gay men and lesbian women, such as fashion or career choice, to make snap judgments about who
is gay or lesbian (Cox & Devine, 2015). Whereas stereotyping is often considered inappropriate (Cox & Devine, 2015;
Devine, 1989; Devine & Elliot, 1995), giving this specific
stereotyping process the alternate label of “gaydar” makes
it seem acceptable. In other words, the gaydar myth legitimizes stereotyping to infer orientation. In a high-powered experiment (Cox et al., 2016, Study 5; achieved power
for observed effect, 1 − β > 0.999), we demonstrated that,
compared to a control group, people who were led to
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believe that “gaydar is real” relied more heavily on stereotypes to categorize men as gay. People who were told that
gaydar is merely another term for stereotyping, however,
stereotyped at much lower rates, even though they were
neither discouraged from stereotyping nor told that the
stereotypes were inaccurate. These results directly demonstrate that the folk notion of gaydar serves the function
of a legitimizing myth: Rhetoric that authenticates gaydar
increases stereotyping, but identifying gaydar as stereotyping decreases reliance on stereotypes.
The people who rely most on stereotype-based gaydar
are also more motivated to express prejudice (Forscher,
Cox, Graetz, & Devine, 2015), and using stereotypes to privately make a snap judgment that someone is gay grants
“plausible deniability” to express anti-gay aggression (Cox
& Devine, 2014). In an aggression study using real electric shocks, a key subset of people took advantage of this
plausible deniability as a smokescreen for their anti-gay
prejudice, administering high levels of electric shocks to
a man who was stereotypically implied to be gay (Cox &
Devine, 2014). Although the cultural notion of gaydar may
seem lighthearted, evidence indicates that the stereotyping processes camouflaged under the guise of gaydar can
have pernicious effects.
Inaccuracy of Gaydar
Whether or not stereotyping relates to other adverse consequences, it is possible for stereotypes to yield accurate
snap judgments. In fact, as reviewed extensively by Rule
and colleagues (2016) in reply to our recent article (Cox
et al., 2016), several researchers claim that people’s snap
judgments about sexual orientation are largely accurate
(e.g., Gaudio, 1994; Johnson, Gill, Reichman, & Tassinary,
2007; Rieger, Linsenmeier, Gygax, Garcia, & Bailey, 2010;
Rule, Ambady, Adams, & Macrae, 2008). We argued that
the conclusions of this past work were misleading and incorrect, based on (a) a methodological confound we serendipitously uncovered and (b) a fundamental flaw in the
reasoning and design of the past work. As we review next,
Rule, Johnson, and Freeman’s (2016) reply falls short of
addressing either of these issues.
Internal Validity Problems in Past Face-Based Gaydar
Research
As reported in Cox et al. (2016), we found a quality confound in two stimulus sets collected in an attempt to replicate and extend some of Rule et al.’s (2008) work on
perceiving orientation from the face (i.e., “face-based gaydar”). We discovered a natural confound, such that gay
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men’s and lesbian women’s pictures were of higher quality
than those of their straight counterparts. When we controlled for quality statistically or matched the stimuli on
quality, the “gaydar” effects found in previous work disappeared. Rule et al. (2016) did not present any data or arguments that disputed or tried to explain this nonreplication.
In response to the possibility that their stimulus sets may
contain the same quality confound, they collected data on
the quality of their stimuli, finding that quality confounds
existed in only five of their 13 stimulus sets. Several of the
confounds in their stimulus sets were in the opposite direction of the confound we discovered, which they erroneously offered as evidence against our claims. Rule and
colleagues (2016) seem to misunderstand our original article. The quality confounds, in our stimuli and in theirs,
are a serious threat to internal validity, not a pattern that
we theoretically predicted in a particular direction. Any experiment with built-in confounds is inherently undermined
by those confounds, no matter their direction. With our
two stimulus sets and Rule and colleagues’ (2008) 13 sets,
in total 47% of the stimulus sets contained quality confounds, which does not inspire confidence about the internal validity of this area of work.
Quality is but one confound that may exist among
stimulus sets. Because Rule and colleagues (2008) do not
share their stimuli with outside research teams, other scientists cannot evaluate any other dimensions on which
their stimuli may differ. Nevertheless, even if further studies can address these internal validity threats and replicate
past patterns of “accurate” orientation perception, doing
so will not address the more fundamental flaw inherent in
the reasoning underlying this area of work.
Evidence of Accuracy in the Lab Provides Evidence of
Inaccuracy in the Real World
Rule et al. (2016) repeatedly state that our article ignored
large swaths of evidence demonstrating the accuracy of
gaydar. This claim, however, is incorrect. Although we did
not specifically cite and review every paper they mentioned, we concretely identified a mathematical and logical error that is shared by all past gaydar research (see Cox
et al., 2016, pp. 167–168; see also Plöderl, 2014). In so doing, we directly demonstrated that the patterns heralded
as evidence of accurate gaydar in fact provide direct evidence that gaydar is highly inaccurate.
Gaydar studies largely follow the same basic formula,
as follows: Participants are asked to make gay-or-straight
judgments based on stimuli (e.g., pictures, video, sound
clips) gathered from gay men and straight men.1 Half of
the stimuli come from straight men and half come from

1. We crafted our example with gay and straight men, for simplicity and to match the majority of past work reporting to demonstrate accurate gaydar. The same mathematical principles and conclusions apply, however, to studies about categorization of lesbian and straight women, and to the
rare studies that examine bisexual categorization.
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Figure 1. Laboratory
evidence of gaydar accuracy provides evidence of real-world inaccuracy. Past gaydar
research typically reports a 60% accuracy
rate in lab studies using a false base rate in
which 50% of the targets are gay men. This
figure shows what 60%
accuracy looks like
when translated to a
real-world situation in
which only 5% of men
are gay. Out of every 100 men, there will
be 38 miscategorized
straight men and three
correctly categorized
gay men. Based on all
published evidence, using gaydar to identify
someone as gay will be
incorrect 93% of the
time (38 / [38 + 3] =
92.7%).

gay men, and accuracy is assessed relative to 50% chance,
which is the accuracy rate one would get if participants
were purely guessing. In this work, people typically have
55% to 65% accuracy, which is significantly higher than
50% chance. Based on this evidence, then, do people
have accurate gaydar? At first glance, the answer seems
to be yes; people are correct more than they are incorrect. Further thought, however, reveals that this conclusion is erroneous.
The fundamental error in this work is its reliance on
artificial base rates, in which 50% of the targets are gay.
In the real world, the best estimates we have say that,
at most, 5% of men identify as gay (Savin-Williams,
2006). This consideration of ecological validity drastically
changes the interpretation of the 60% accuracy rate.2 Figure 1 shows what a 60% accuracy rate looks like when
translated to the real world, where only 5% of men are
gay. An accuracy rate of 60% means that 40% of straight
men are miscategorized as gay, and this 40% far outnumbers the 5% of men who are actually gay. Once real-world
base rates of gay men are considered, all available evidence from past work indicates that when perceivers “use

their gaydar” to conclude that someone is gay, they will be
wrong 93% of the time. Overall accuracy of 60% translates
to 7% accuracy for identifying who is gay. This statistic is
readily derived from the data of all past gaydar studies,
and it provides a very clear answer: There is no pragmatic
accuracy to gaydar.
Next Steps: Saving the Baby From the Bathwater
Our critique of past gaydar research is most precisely focused on the claim that “people can accurately perceive
who is gay.” Based on all available evidence, this conclusion is mathematically incorrect. An alternate phrasing of
this claim is that “people can accurately perceive orientation,” which, arguably, seems more justified, given that
60% of the straight men are categorized correctly. But
even this claim is misleading when one notes that if people assumed that everyone was straight, they would have
95% accuracy. Any alleged process for “perceiving orientation” is meaningless if it does not yield pragmatic accuracy for identifying members of the numerical minority
from among the majority. Furthermore, we have shown

2. This mathematical reasoning involves a basic application of Bayes’s theorem, which is necessary for understanding probabilities and accuracy
(Hooper, 2013; McGrayne, 2011).
3. This research objective brings with it many other potential difficulties to consider, most especially representative sampling of sexual minorities
(Harry, 1986).
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experimentally that this claim perpetuates stereotyping
to infer orientation (Cox et al., 2016), a stereotyping process that has adverse consequences (Cox & Devine, 2014;
Forscher et al., 2015).
Although the conclusion that people can accurately
perceive orientation is incorrect, the research that has
been used to support that conclusion can still inform the
literature in meaningful ways. As we noted previously (Cox
et al., 2016, p. 168), lab studies with artificial base rates can
be useful for exploring intergroup similarities and differences between straight people and lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people.3 For example, learning about what
factors cause sexual orientation has been one of the biggest areas of study for sexuality researchers (DeLamater & Hyde, 1998). Insomuch as these past studies document meaningful group similarities and differences that
can build or test theories about the etiology of orientation, they are highly valuable to sexuality science (e.g., LeVay, 2011; Rieger et al., 2010).
Even if they yield no pragmatic accuracy, understanding the cues people use to make snap judgments about
orientation also has tremendous potential to inform our
understanding of social perception, bias, and discrimination. If someone’s facial structure, gait, or voice leads
to a snap judgment or tacit inference about orientation,
what consequences does that have? Will it affect hiring
outcomes? Will it lead to social avoidance, anti-gay aggression, or other prejudice-related behaviors? Do these
snap judgments lead to additional stereotypic inferences,
for instance, about abilities, proclivities, and personality
traits? Although we have shown that using stereotypes
to infer sexual orientation leads to meaningful behavioral outcomes (Cox & Devine, 2014), we are not aware
of any research demonstrating that inferences based on
the face, voice, or body movement lead to discriminatory
or prejudicial outcomes. Inferences based on these traits
will not be accurate in the real world, but it is clear from
this prolific body of work that people do use them to
make snap judgments about orientation. The behavioral
processes that follow these snap judgments are open for
future exploration. Even if people cannot always accurately judge a book by its cover, there is much we can
learn from the fact that people often make those judgments anyway.
ORCID — William T. L. Cox
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5978-8195
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